Root Cause Analysis Worksheet Template

What requires or shapes this record

No source we read prescribes a root cause analysis form or a single method, and HSE says it endorses none. Whether an investigation is needed, and how deep it goes, comes from elsewhere. In Great Britain, HSG245 ties investigations to the duty in regulation 5 of the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 to plan, organise, control, monitor and review preventive and protective measures, and to reviewing risk assessments after an adverse event. In the United States, OSHA's guide for employers is advisory and creates no new obligation, but a site under the process safety management standard must investigate each incident that caused, or could reasonably have caused, a catastrophic release of highly hazardous chemicals, starting within 48 hours, with a written report of the contributing factors and recommendations whose findings are resolved and documented (29 CFR 1910.119(m)). Management system standards such as ISO 45001 also cover incidents and corrective action; their text is paid, was not opened for this page, and nothing on this form is taken from it. The public guidance read for this page agrees on the steps: gather evidence before it changes, put events in order, keep asking why until the answer points to something the organisation is able to change, look past the person to the system, and check that the actions work. The worksheet follows those steps. A completed worksheet is not evidence that you comply with any rule, and nothing on this page is legal advice.

• HSE, Investigating accidents and incidents: a workbook for employers, unions, safety representatives and safety professionals (HSG245, published 2004; the web page and the PDF read on 22 October 2026)

  HSE's workbook sets four steps: gathering the information, analysing it, identifying risk control measures, and the action plan and its implementation. It names three levels of cause: the immediate cause, the plainest reason the event happened; the underlying cause, a less obvious system or organisational reason; and the root cause, the initial failing from which the others grow, generally a management, planning or organisational failing. The depth of an investigation is set by the worst potential consequence and the likelihood of recurrence, not by the harm suffered this time, with four levels from a supervisor's look into a minimal-risk event to a team investigation supervised by senior management. Management and workers should both take part, and the team should be led by, or report to, someone with authority to act on its recommendations. Its analysis asks why repeatedly until the answers stop being meaningful, then works through checklists of immediate causes under the place, the plant, the process and the people, and of underlying and root causes under control, co-operation, communication, competence, design, implementation and risk assessment. It says investigations that blame operator error alone are rarely acceptable, that blame before the investigation is counter-productive, and that vague recommendations show the root causes were not reached. Risk controls are preferred in the order eliminate, control at source, then rely on people; the action plan should have SMART objectives, a person and a timescale for each measure and a senior person who sees that the plan as a whole is carried out, with progress reviewed. Risk assessments are reviewed after an adverse event (in Great Britain under regulation 3(3) of the 1999 Regulations), and the workbook asks whether similar risks exist elsewhere and whether similar events have happened before. HSE does not endorse any one analysis method. The workbook's own report and analysis forms were not copied; the PDF file is a 2014 print of the 2004 workbook and some of its references are out of date.

• OSHA (United States), Incident Investigation topic page and 'Incident [Accident] Investigations: A Guide for Employers' (December 2015), both read on 22 October 2026

  OSHA encourages employers to investigate every incident in which a worker was hurt and every close call, prefers the word incident to accident because nearly all such events are preventable, and says investigations should look for root causes rather than fault and should bring managers and employees together. It warns that blaming carelessness or a skipped procedure on its own is easy and often misleading, and asks why the shortcoming existed and why nobody had dealt with it before. The guide (https://www.osha.gov/sites/default/files/IncInvGuide4Empl_Dec2015.pdf) sets four steps: preserve and document the scene, collect information, determine root causes and implement corrective actions. It defines root causes as the underlying reasons why unsafe conditions exist or a rule was not followed, usually management, design, planning, organisational or operational failings, found by asking why persistently. It lists sources of information beyond interviews, among them equipment manuals, company policies, maintenance records and logs, training records, audit reports and earlier corrective action recommendations, and asks interviewers to make clear that the purpose is fact-finding, not fault-finding. It treats an investigation as unfinished until corrective actions that deal with the root causes are in place, and that weak actions, such as telling employees to remember their PPE, are unlikely to prevent another incident. Where a temporary worker is involved, both the staffing agency and the host employer should investigate. The guide states that it is advisory and creates no new legal obligation; its appendix form was not copied.

• OSHA and EPA, fact sheet 'The Importance of Root Cause Analysis During Incident Investigation' (DOC FS-3895, October 2016), with OSHA's Recommended Practices for Safety and Health Programs, Hazard Identification and Assessment (action item 4) and Hazard Prevention and Control (action item 6), read on 22 October 2026

  The fact sheet describes a root cause as a basic, system-level reason for an incident that points to one or more system failures that can be corrected, and says a good analysis finds all of them, since there is often more than one. Its example is a worker who slips on oil: cleaning the spill and telling the worker to be careful treats a symptom, while asking where the oil came from, why it stayed and whether it was reported can lead to a missing inspection and repair programme. It lists tools to combine (brainstorming, checklists, logic or event trees, timelines, sequence diagrams and causal factor determination) and four questions to answer: what happened, how, why, and what needs to be corrected. It recommends involving employees and sharing the results, and states that it is guidance only. OSHA's recommended practices (https://www.osha.gov/safety-management/hazard-Identification) ask for investigations by a trained team of managers and workers that identify root causes, including for close calls, and that do not stop at a worker's error but ask about tools, time, training and supervision. Action item 6 of the hazard prevention page (https://www.osha.gov/safety-management/hazard-prevention) asks employers to track the implementation of controls, check that they are used and working, involve workers in evaluating them and add further controls where they are not effective. These pages are recommendations, not a standard.

• U.S. Department of Energy, DOE-NE-STD-1004-92, Root Cause Analysis Guidance Document (February 1992; PDF on energy.gov read on 22 October 2026)

  Written for DOE Order 5000.3A on occurrence reporting, the document divides a root cause investigation into five phases: data collection, assessment, corrective actions, informing others and follow-up. Among the methods it describes are events and causal factor analysis (the time sequence of actions and the surrounding conditions), change analysis (for an obscure cause, comparing with what was expected), barrier analysis (the physical, administrative and procedural barriers that were meant to stop the event), MORT, human performance evaluation and Kepner-Tregoe. It defines a causal factor as a condition or event that results in an effect; the direct cause as the one that directly resulted in the occurrence; a contributing cause as one that played a part but would not on its own have caused it; and the root cause as the one whose correction would stop this occurrence and similar ones from happening again, pursued through a series of causes until the fundamental, correctable one is found. Its tests for corrective actions include whether they prevent recurrence, whether they are feasible and whether they introduce new risks, and it contrasts a measurable action (revising a named procedure step) with one that cannot be measured (making sure the step is done correctly). Follow-up checks that actions were implemented and are preventing recurrence; if an event recurs, the original analysis is re-evaluated. The root cause analysis software guide on this site cites the same document.

• CCOHS (Canada), Incident Investigation, OSH Answers fact sheet (last revised 23 June 2025; read on 22 October 2026)

  CCOHS frames an investigation as fact-finding that should end in corrective action rather than blame, and says even simple incidents seldom, if ever, have a single cause. It separates direct causes (unsafe conditions or acts) from indirect causes or contributing factors such as training, supervision, workplace design and management programmes, and warns that investigators tend to find the kind of cause they already believe in. It says there is no single definitive way to do root cause analysis and names the 5 Whys, brainstorming and fault tree analysis as common tools. Its causation model groups causes into five categories (task, material, environment, personnel and management) and stresses that the categories matter less than asking every question. Physical evidence is recorded first because it changes fastest, and witnesses are kept apart and interviewed alone, soon and in their own words. Each conclusion should be checked for whether it rests on direct physical or documentary evidence, an eyewitness account or an assumption, and the report should say which. Recommendations should be specific, identify root causes and contributing factors, and avoid discipline. The organisation then plans the corrective actions, carries them out and evaluates whether they worked; follow-up includes saying which recommendations cannot be carried out and why, setting a timetable, assigning each action and monitoring completion. It also cautions that pre-set forms may be limiting, which is why this worksheet leaves room for the team's own lines and attachments.

• U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB), 'Mission' page and Recommendations FAQ (both read on 22 October 2026)

  The CSB is an independent federal agency that investigates chemical incidents to determine their cause or probable cause; it issues no fines or citations. Its mission page (https://www.csb.gov/about-the-csb/mission/) describes investigators interviewing witnesses, sending samples and equipment to independent laboratories and examining safety and maintenance records, inventories and operating procedures, then drafting key findings, conclusions and recommendations over several months. Its FAQ says each recommendation is monitored from issue to closing, stays open while action is under way and is closed once the recipient has shown evidence of appropriate action. The status designations distinguish, among others, acceptable action, an acceptable alternative action that meets the recommendation's objective, action that exceeds it, an unacceptable response or none, and recommendations that no longer apply or were superseded. The worksheet's result column borrows two ideas from this: an action closes on evidence that it worked, and a different action can close a cause if it meets the same objective. The CSB's scheme applies to its own recommendations, and the worksheet's wording is ours.

• 29 CFR 1910.119(m), Incident investigation, under process safety management (eCFR, Title 29 up to date as of 20 October 2026), and regulation 5 of the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 (Great Britain; legislation.gov.uk, no outstanding effects listed), both read on 22 October 2026

  Paragraph (m) requires an employer covered by the US process safety management standard to investigate every incident that caused, or could reasonably have caused, a catastrophic release of highly hazardous chemicals, to begin promptly and within 48 hours at the latest, and to use a team with at least one person who knows the process, including a contract employee where contract work was involved. The report must include, at a minimum, the date of the incident, the date the investigation began, a description of the incident, the factors that contributed to it and any recommendations. The employer must have a system to address and resolve the findings and recommendations promptly and document the resolutions, review the report with all affected personnel whose work is relevant, contract employees included, and keep the report for five years. Regulation 5 of the Great Britain regulations (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1999/3242/regulation/5) requires employers to have, and to put into effect, arrangements for planning, organising, controlling, monitoring and reviewing their preventive and protective measures, and to record those arrangements where five or more people are employed. These are two examples; other countries and sectors have their own rules.

Each source checked on 22 October 2026. Not legal advice; check the text in force for your site.

Field by field

Fill the sections in order, but expect to go back: new evidence reopens the timeline and the chains. Every answer in sections 4 to 7 points to an E number from section 2, and every action in section 8 to a causal factor or root cause from sections 6 and 7. Use roles rather than names wherever the record will be shared. The categories, the codes (F, W and A; C, R and ?; C or P; E, S, H and M) and the example lines are ours.

Handed over from (incident report or nonconformance report number)

Why: The worksheet continues a record that already exists. Pointing to it by number keeps the first account as it was written and stops the analysis from rewriting the facts, which both OSHA and CCOHS keep apart from the analysis that follows.

Common mistake: Copying the incident report into the worksheet and then editing the copy as the team's view changes.

Level of investigation

Why: HSG245 sets the depth by the worst credible consequence and how likely the event is to happen again, from a supervisor's look into a minimal-risk event to a team investigation overseen by senior management. A near miss that could have ended badly may warrant a deeper look than a minor injury.

Common mistake: Choosing the level from the injury actually suffered, so a collapse that happened to hurt nobody gets a one-line review.

Team, and the manager with authority to act

Why: OSHA prefers managers and employees investigating together, and HSG245 wants the team led by, or reporting to, someone who can decide on its recommendations. For a covered process incident in the US, 29 CFR 1910.119(m)(3) asks for at least one person who knows the process, and a contract employee where contract work was involved.

Common mistake: A team that can only recommend, so its actions wait months for someone with a budget.

Terms of reference

Why: The questions the investigation has to answer set its scope and tell the team when it has finished. Writing down what is left out stops the work drifting into a review of everything.

Common mistake: No stated question, so the report answers whatever the lead investigator found most interesting.

Evidence log (E1, E2 ...)

Why: Every later answer cites an E number. OSHA's guide lists records worth collecting, from equipment manuals and maintenance logs to training records and earlier corrective action recommendations, and CCOHS records physical evidence first because it changes fastest.

Common mistake: Photos on a phone with no note of who took them, when and where, so nobody can later say what they show.

Basis: fact, witness account or assumption

Why: CCOHS suggests checking each conclusion for whether it rests on direct physical or documentary evidence, an eyewitness account or an assumption, and saying so in the report. The letter beside each item makes the weak points visible before they reach a conclusion.

Common mistake: Treating a supervisor's view of what usually happens as a fact about the shift in question.

Timeline of events and conditions

Why: HSG245 asks for the chain of events in time order, chance occurrences included, and the OSHA and EPA fact sheet lists timelines among the tools for root cause work. Conditions such as a stock-out or a vacancy belong on it as well as actions.

Common mistake: A timeline that starts at the moment of injury and leaves out the weeks in which the conditions built up.

Different from normal?

Why: HSG245 notes that adverse events often happen when something is different, and DOE's guidance describes change analysis for causes that are hard to see: compare with the last time the task went right.

Common mistake: Overlooking a change because someone outside the team made it, such as a supplier or another department.

Why-chain, tested against the evidence

Why: HSG245 asks why until the answers stop being meaningful, and OSHA says conclusions such as 'careless' or 'did not follow the procedure' stop short of the root cause. Each answer here carries its evidence and a status, so the provisional why lines from an incident report become tested findings or are dropped.

Common mistake: Five whys written in one sitting from memory, with no evidence beside any of them.

Explanations rejected

Why: An explanation tested and ruled out is a result. Keeping it saves the next investigator from repeating the test and shows readers that other causes were considered; CCOHS warns that investigators tend to find the kind of cause they already believe in.

Common mistake: Deleting rejected ideas, so the report reads as if only one cause was ever considered.

Fishbone categories and status

Why: The six headings are ours, drawn from HSG245's four areas for immediate causes (place, plant, process, people) and CCOHS's five categories (task, material, environment, personnel, management); CCOHS adds that the categories matter less than asking every question. Each candidate is marked confirmed, ruled out or open.

Common mistake: Reading a full bone as a finding: a candidate becomes a cause only when the evidence log supports it.

Causal factors (direct or contributing)

Why: DOE's guidance separates the direct cause from contributing causes, and HSG245 the immediate from the underlying; both expect several. Naming the control or barrier that was missing, failed or was not used links each factor back to the risk assessment.

Common mistake: Writing a person ('operator error') as the causal factor instead of the condition or action and what made it likely.

Management system check

Why: HSG245 says root causes are almost always management, organisational or planning failings, groups them under control, co-operation, communication, competence, design, implementation and risk assessment, and wants this part done by people with authority to change the system. The questions beside each heading are our summary.

Common mistake: Answering 'no gap' on every heading because the procedures exist on paper.

Root causes

Why: DOE describes the root cause as the one whose correction prevents this and similar events, and the OSHA and EPA fact sheet as a correctable system failure, adding that there is often more than one. The two test columns ask whether fixing it reaches beyond this event and whether it is within your control.

Common mistake: Stopping at a cause outside your control ('the supplier changed the packaging') without asking why nobody noticed the change.

Corrective or preventive, and the kind of action

Why: HSG245 prefers measures that eliminate the risk, then those that control it at source, then those that rely on people, and asks whether the same risk exists elsewhere, which is what a preventive action covers. The kind letter shows at a glance whether a plan leans on reminders and training.

Common mistake: An action plan of 'take care' and retraining only; HSG245 reads vague recommendations as a sign that the root causes were not reached.

Owner, due date and date done

Why: HSG245 asks for SMART objectives, a person and a timescale for each measure and a senior person who sees that the plan as a whole is carried out. CCOHS adds that the response should say which recommendations will not be carried out, and why.

Common mistake: 'Management' as the owner, and a due date that slips without anyone recording why.

Effectiveness check and result

Why: DOE's guidance ends with follow-up to confirm that actions work and are preventing recurrence, OSHA's recommended practices ask employers to check that controls are effective, and the CSB closes a recommendation as acceptable only once the recipient has shown evidence of appropriate action. The result column, not the done date, decides closure.

Common mistake: Closing an action the day the procedure is reissued, before anyone has watched the task done the new way.

Close-out

Why: HSG245 asks for risk assessments and procedures to be reviewed after an adverse event, for similar risks elsewhere to be checked and for earlier similar events to be considered. For a covered process incident, 29 CFR 1910.119(m)(6) requires the report to be reviewed with affected personnel, contract employees included.

Common mistake: Fixing the dock where it happened and not telling the other docks that take deliveries from the same supplier.

Sign-off

Why: The representative's signature shows the findings were reviewed with the workforce, the manager's that the action plan has an owner with resources, and the closing signature that someone read the effectiveness checks before closing the file.

Common mistake: A single signature from the lead investigator, so nobody with authority has committed to the actions.

Worked example

IllustrativeThe action tracker from an invented investigation of a hand cut at a goods-in dock on 14 March, picking up the hand-off in the incident report template's worked example (invented site, people, records and dates)

The dock, people, records and dates are made up for illustration and continue the incident report template's example. The investigation tested that report's provisional why lines and confirmed the missing reorder point for safety cutters. It also found two things they missed: fixed blades had been bought locally once the cutters ran out (purchase card log, E7), and a supplier had started strapping pallets in February without anyone reviewing what that changed at the dock (delivery notes, E6, and the dock procedure, E4). 'Operator not trained' was tested and rejected, because the induction record (E8) covers safety cutters. A2 and A4 change management arrangements, A3 removes the need to cut straps, and A5 relies on people, so its check watches the task instead of counting signatures.

When a spreadsheet stops being enough

A printed worksheet or a spreadsheet holds one analysis well when a small team owns it from start to finish. It strains when several investigations run at once and the same evidence or root cause has to be traced across them, when a root cause found at one site turns up again at another months later and nobody connects the two, and when actions sit in a list that no one reopens once the due date has passed.

Software can link each why-answer and each fishbone candidate to the evidence behind it, keep rejected explanations visible, carry root causes into a CAPA record and schedule the effectiveness check. When you compare products, ask whether a cause can be marked rejected with its evidence instead of being deleted, whether an action can close without a recorded check, how a recurrence reopens the earlier investigation, and whether an export keeps the links between evidence, causes and actions. The products listed below meet the rule of our root cause analysis software guide; that shows a documented capability, not that a product supports this worksheet's layout, so run one of your own closed investigations through a trial before deciding.

Same rule for every product: tagged “Root Cause & Investigation”, “Incident Management”, “Incident Reporting”, “CAPA Management”, “Quality Management”, “Safety Management”, “EHS Management”, “Occupational Health”, “Risk Assessment”, “Risk Management”, “Food Safety”, “Audits & Inspections” or “Barrier Management”, with a sourced root cause analysis capability in its record, or one the vendor stated to us, labelled as vendor-stated. Documented and conditional capabilities qualify; check the linked scope before treating a module as included.

Tekmon pays for a sponsored placement (above); its place in this list follows the same rule as every entry. How lists are ordered

• EHS Insight · Quality management and CAPA · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 14 October 2026

• Effivity · Customer complaint lifecycle · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 14 October 2026

• Emex · Incident investigations · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 11 October 2026

• Intelex · Nonconformance, action plans and corrective action · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 14 October 2026

• SoterAI and SoterCoach · Safety CAPA and quality-management boundary · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 12 October 2026

• Synergi Life (DNV) · Incident investigation and corrective follow-up · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 14 October 2026

• Tekmon · Incident root cause analysis · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 28 September 2026

• EASE · Formal Action Plans and root-cause analysis · Conditional

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 14 October 2026

• HSI Donesafe · Quality and supplier management · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 14 October 2026

• Intellect QMS · NCR to CAPA with AI root cause · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 14 October 2026

• IsoMetrix · Incident follow-up · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 14 October 2026

• isoTracker · CAPA and root cause analysis · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 14 October 2026

• ITRAK 365 · Incident and near-miss investigation · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 14 October 2026

• myosh · Quality nonconformance, CAPA and sign-off · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 10 October 2026

• Safety Evolution · Incident reporting and investigation · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 14 October 2026

• SafetyAmp · Photo-supported incidents · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 14 October 2026

• SafetyChain · Root-cause and audit workflow tools · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 14 October 2026

• Scilife · Quality events and investigations · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 10 October 2026

• VelocityEHS · Incident investigation and OSHA reporting · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 14 October 2026

• Accupoint · CAPA management · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 10 October 2026

• Benchmark Gensuite · Incident investigation · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 14 October 2026

• Dot Compliance · Quality-event dashboards and trending · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 10 October 2026

• Ecesis · Incident reporting and investigation · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 14 October 2026

• EHS Hero · Incident and near-miss reporting and investigation · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 14 October 2026

• GOARC · Incident reporting, investigation and action-complete closure · Conditional

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 11 October 2026

• Intenseye · Incident and inspection workflows · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 14 October 2026

• iProtectU · Incident reporting and investigation · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 12 October 2026

• MasterControl · Internal audit planning and finding management · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 14 October 2026

• Notify Technology · Spark AI companion · Conditional

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 14 October 2026

• Novara Flex · Incident investigation and OSHA recordkeeping · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 10 October 2026

• Octave Reliance · CAPA and structured root-cause analysis · Conditional

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 12 October 2026

• Onspring · Root-cause and corrective-action tracking · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 10 October 2026

• Procore Quality & Safety · Incident investigation records · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 14 October 2026

• Qavach.AI · System-assisted root-cause analysis · Conditional

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 11 October 2026

• Qualityze · CAPA effectiveness check · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 12 October 2026

• Red-on-line Core · Incident management and investigation · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 14 October 2026

• RLDatix · Root cause analysis and action tracking · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 10 October 2026

• Salus · Incident capture and OSHA recordkeeping context · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 14 October 2026

• SciSure Health & Safety (EHS) · Incident and near-miss reporting · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 12 October 2026

• SMS360 · Incident capture, investigation and corrective actions · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 14 October 2026

• Sodales · Root cause analysis and corrective actions · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 14 October 2026

• symplr · Root cause analysis · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 14 October 2026

• TenForce · Incident and near-miss management · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 14 October 2026

• Q-Hub · CAPA workflows · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 14 October 2026

• ERA-EHS · Health & Safety workflows · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 14 October 2026

• Qooling · Incident-to-CAPA follow-up · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 14 October 2026

• SoftExpert · Nonconformities, root cause and corrective actions · Documented

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 14 October 2026

• BizzMine · Audit, complaint, deviation, supplier, calibration and recall modules · Conditional

  Product scope and boundaries

  Vendor source · Profile checked 14 October 2026

All 48 matching profiles are shown. Documentation review, not hands-on testing or a claim of compliance.